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Abstract 
 
Beginning in 2008, rating agencies have loosen their rating criteria of Chinese corporate 
bond rating. The change in rating standard remains statistically significant after considering the 
macroeconomic factors. A lack of diversification in ratings and failure to rate through economic 
cycle are found. As for the factors that have impact on the rating, Bigger size, higher profitability 
and better solvency help increase the rating for a corporate bond issuer, while higher liquidity, and 
lower leverage do harm to the credit rating. Such discoveries are consistent with the conditions in 
US corporate debt market. Our conclusion is robust after multicollinearity test and adding 
additional macroeconomic explanatory variables. 
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1:  Introduction 
 
Based on the analysis of US corporate bond market, the rating agencies have become 
more conservative on the issuer ratings during the period 1985-2009 (Baghai, 2014). As 
corresponding research about Chinese corporate bond market is limited, we would like to 
determine whether the credit rating standards of Chinese rating agencies have changed over time.  
In China, companies can issue debt through two different concurrently existing systems. 
The first system began in 1993 at the time of planned economy. This issue system is political 
approval system with limited issuance offering each year. Under such a system, the criteria before 
issuance are quite strict. For example, the debt structure of the company should below 40%, and 
banks should fully guarantee the debt. However, after issuance, credit rating updates are not 
required. Another system is a more international one, beginning in 2007, called trading 
registration system. If the issuer meets all the requirement and register relative information in the 
trading exchange, the debt can be issued without approval from regulation commission. 
After the latter corporate bond issuing system showed up, public companies are able to 
issue corporation bond through two stock exchanges in China after they get credit rating grades 
from the rating agencies. Their credit ratings are continuously updated by those agencies after 
issuance if expected default risk changes. Nowadays, the small private enterprises still rely on the 
first issuing system, while huge government-owned enterprises have already turned their face to 
the latter system, especially after they are transferred to public-owned corporations. Our study is 
focused on the corporation debt issuing from the latter system. Besides, we focus on long-term 
corporation bond, ignoring SCP((Short-term Commercial Paper). 
First, we obtain all the credit rating data of corporate bond issuers from Wind database 
during the sample period 2007 to 2014. Then we choose 27 essential factors as explanatory 
variables to the rating variable, calculated from the financial statement of the issuers between 
2006 and 2013, one-year lag is added to ensure that the ratings are graded based on available 
information at the time point. 
In the panel data described below, we introduce year dummies in the regression model to 
measure the time effect on rating. As a result, we find all the coefficients of the dummies are 
statistically significant. Based on the discovery, we divide whole period to two sub-periods. We 
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redo the regression model with one period dummy for five possible cut-off point choices and get 
consistent result with the basic model, implying that the credit rating standards relax have 
happened after the financial crisis. 
Further, we try to determine the change in the rating standard between the two sub-periods. 
We conduct two cross sectional regressions in two periods (without dummies) and compare the 
estimates of the explanatory variables, using 2011 as a cut-off point in the analysis. 
At last, we check the robustness of the rating model to exclude two potential threatens for 
our discovery. We use the VIF value to exclude the possibility of multicollinearity in explanatory 
variables. Besides, macroeconomic factors are added to ensure that the inflation in ratings is not 
simply because of a better economy.   
Based on our limited date and research, we can obtain the conclusion that Chinese credit 
rating agencies become less conservative through time, which indicate an opposite discovery for 
US agencies. 
  
3 
 
 
 
2:  Literature Review 
 
The credit rating agencies play an important role on assessing the financial situations 
about securities and bonds. There are three main rating agencies in the USA, Fitch Ratings, 
Moody’s Investors Service, and Standard & Poor’s. After the subprime crisis in 2008, however, 
the creditworthiness information of rating agencies was criticized by public as they cannot reflect 
the market conditions immediately (White (2010)).  
Mason and Rosner (2007) advocate the agency ratings were misapplied by the investors. 
Due to the conflicts between different rating agencies, investors became confused. Additionally, 
Griffin and Tang (2012) argue that top rating agencies always made positive adjustments beyond 
its standard model. 
There are several government authorized rating agencies in China, such as Dagong Global 
Credit Rating Co., Golden Credit Rating International Co., United Credit Ratings Co., China 
Lianhe Credit Rating Co., China Cheng Xin International Credit Rating Co. and so on. The 
competition between different agencies has occurred. Becker and Milbourn (2011) report that the 
highly competitive phenomenon will affect the rating market, the effectiveness of ratings will 
decrease and the ratings agencies may feel pressure to adjust the rating levels to benefit the 
companies who issued securities.  
As investors will make decision based on the rating information, well-known credit 
ratings agencies will motivate by issuing “friendly” ratings results to protect their excellent 
reputations (Covitz and Harrison (2003)). 
According to these comprehensive situations, financial institutions feel that they cannot 
rely on these rating reports any more. Partnoy (2009) suggests the overdependence on credit 
ratings cause the financial crisis and rating policies should be revised to “build trust” between 
rating agencies and investors. 
From several researches, financial institutions find that, even in the same rating, 
downgraded corporate bond issuers will face different rating transition and default risk compared 
to upgraded issuers (Hamilton and Cantor (2004)). Based on the data from Chinese market, rating 
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transition is efficient, imply that in the long term, the credit rating standards are stable in China 
and the default rate is relatively low.  
In this paper, we would like to analyze what kinds of elements will affect the credit rating 
policy based on the Chinese securities market. In 1998, Blume, Lim and MacKinlay propose that 
the downgrades of securities credit rating do not mean the securities qualities decline. An 
alternative explanation is, however, the standard policy of rating agencies become stricter.  
There are four main factors which influence Chinese rating standards, the size of company 
asset portfolio, the debt ratio, investment opportunities and securities issuers’ conditions (Tang 
2014).  
As we mentioned before, Becker and Millbourn (2011) thought the competition between 
different rating agencies will affect the standard policies of credit ratings. Meanwhile, Jorion, Shi, 
and Zhang (2008) found that the downward trend in ratings may have occurred regarding to 
different issuers. The time value of accounting qualities may tight the standards of 
investment-grade issuers, as well as Alp (2010) show that the structural shift will occur tighten 
ratings standards. 
Regarding to the comparative research between Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, 
in 2012, Jiang, Stanford, and Xie demonstrate that who pays for the ratings will impact the rating 
results. It is obvious that issuer-pay method will obtain a higher securities ratings. Therefore, 
these findings suggest that the standard policies are attributed to “who pay the bills”. At the same 
time, Zhang and Chen (2014) also point out that, because rating agencies in China are new to 
some content, the rating results will under pressure of issuer-pay model. Therefore, it’s hard to 
say whether increasing rating level is due to low credit risk. 
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3:  Data 
 
In this paper, all the data is from Wind database, the most widely used finance database in 
China. Because the history of corporation bond with registration issuance system began in 2007, 
we investigated the credit rating panel data of all the firms over the period 2007 to 2014 for a total 
number of 10394 observations. We input the last day of each year in Wind database and get eight 
cross sectional data outputs, including the rating information of all the existing corporate bonds at 
that time. For year 2014, we choose 2014-11-30 as the last day. We employ the domestic 
long-term issuer credit rating, which is used in prior works (e.g. Baghai(2014) & Kisgen(2006)). 
Governmental enterprises, financials, and utilities are removed from the sample. For many firms 
in our sample, the credit ratings are not updated annually. In such cases, we use previous rating 
update to fill up the following years until a new update came out. For those firms issuing more 
than one corporate bonds at that time, we keep one record and delete others, as they have same 
long-term issuer credit ratings. 
The credit rating data is from a list of qualified Chinese credit rating agencies: Dagong 
International, Eastern Jincheng, CCXI, Lianhe Rating, China Rating, Shanghai Brilliance Credit 
Rating, Shanghai Yuandong Credit Rating. Most of the agencies are co-funded with one of the 
three international rating agencies: S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, although the control rights are within 
Chinese. With international background, these credit rating agencies generally follow the S&P’s 
rating categories although slight differences in judging the risk for each level exist. We adjust the 
ratings data from all the rating agencies into S&P’s rating categories with 22 categories: 
AAA,AA+,AA,AA-,A+,A,A-,BBB+,BBB,BBB-,BB+,BB,BB-,B+,B,B-,CCC+,CCC,CCC-,CC+,
CC,C. When rating decrease, expected default risk increases. In S&P’s category, firms with BBB- 
rating or above are called investment grade firms, and firms with BBB- rating or below are called 
noninvestment grade or junk-rated firms. However, considering that the credit rating measures the 
relative default risk compared to other firms, rather than absolute default risk (Standard & Poor’s, 
2008), and the strict debt issuing policy in China which claims that only the firms with rating 
higher than AA are qualified for issuing debt, we schedule AA as a more appropriate cut-off point 
between investment grade and noninvestment grade, with the actual distributions of the ratings in 
China. 
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Table 3.1 contains the distributions of the ratings during the sample period on annual basis.  
Figure 3.1 plots the annual distribution of the corporation bond issuers in rating categories as well 
as the total number of the issuers during the period. The total number of the issuers experienced 
an exponential growth during the sample period. We next divide the whole sample into 
investment grade and non-investment grade with level AA as the cut-off point in Figure 3.2. 
Different from US corporate debt market, where decline was shown in investment grade debt and 
increase was shown in noninvestment grade (Baghai (2014)), Chinese corporate debt market 
show an increase in investment grade firms and a decline in non-investment grade firms. This 
trend appears to suggest that the credit quality of Chinese corporate debt issuers has improved 
during the period. As we exposed in the paper, a complementary explanation for this trend is that 
Chinese rating agencies tend to be more relaxing over time
1
.  
Besides, we notice that the ratings tend to be more centralized in AA ratings. It comes 
with a decline in the standard deviation. A failure to diversify the ratings implies that the ratings 
don’t fairly represent the risk of the firms to the investors. 
Table 3.1    Number of companies by year and rating categories 
The table contains the distribution of ratings for the sample period. As the table is generated 
from the annual statistics pages of corporation bond from Wind database, due to different 
access to data, this number is slightly different from our sample size.   
 
Rate AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB&below Sum 
2007 
47 40 63 83 61 21 2 3 320 
14.69% 12.50% 19.69% 25.94% 19.06% 6.56% 0.63% 0.94% 100.00% 
2008 
78 65 92 109 57 18 1 1 421 
18.53% 15.44% 21.85% 25.89% 13.54% 4.28% 0.24% 0.24% 100.00% 
2009 
133 120 160 158 39 9 2 1 622 
21.38% 19.29% 25.72% 25.40% 6.27% 1.45% 0.32% 0.16% 100.00% 
2010 
191 162 310 190 32 13 2 1 901 
21.20% 17.98% 34.41% 21.09% 3.55% 1.44% 0.22% 0.11% 100.00% 
2011 
261 276 495 280 57 11 4 8 1392 
18.75% 19.83% 35.56% 20.11% 4.09% 0.79% 0.29% 0.57% 100.00% 
2012 
317 397 886 437 100 8 3 12 2160 
14.68% 18.38% 41.02% 20.23% 4.63% 0.37% 0.14% 0.56% 100.00% 
2013 
370 492 1279 528 103 11 10 23 2816 
13.14% 17.47% 45.42% 18.75% 3.66% 0.39% 0.36% 0.82% 100.00% 
2014 
460 604 1598 534 59 10 5 23 3293 
13.97% 18.34% 48.53% 16.22% 1.79% 0.30% 0.15% 0.70% 100.00% 
                                                             
1
 Another possible explanation is that the credit ratings increase simply because of a better economy. We 
will evaluate this alternative explanation later in Robustness chapter. 
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Figure 3.1   Percentage Distribution of the rating categories 
The main axis measures the number of existing corporate bond issuers in each rating 
categories (bar graph). The sub axis measures the total number of the issuers during the 
period 2007-2014 (line graph). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2   Number of investment grade and non-investment grade 
This graph employs the rate AA as a cut-off point and presents the changes in number of the 
firms of investment grade and non-investment grade on main axis (left). Standard Deviation 
of the ratings are plotted on The sub axis (right).  
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Before we do regression, we translate the alphanumeric credit rating levels into numerical 
scores by adding one point for each rating level. For example, a AAA rating is translated to 22, 
AA+ is translated to 21, etc. The lowest rating C is translated to 1. Under such translation form, 
the higher the score is, the higher the credit rating, and the lower the expected default risk is. 
After the translation, we are able to estimate the impact of the financial statement data on the 
credit rating.  
Afterwards, we match ratings data (dependent variables) with annual financial statement 
data (explanatory variables) for each firm during the period 2007-2014.  
When selecting the explanatory variables, we first follow the prior literature such as 
Baghai (2014), and then conduct an interview to current professionals in CCXI (one of the most 
authorized rating agencies) to fit Chinese market. Some variables are removed based on the high 
correlation (for example, we remove total asset and total cash, and keep cash/asset ratio). Given 
the limitation of the database and the short sample period, some variables that are included in 
Baghai (2014)’s paper have to be ruled out, such as PPE/Asset, Rent Payment/Asset, Volatility of 
profitability (In fact, these variables are also statistically insignificant in the rating model).  
After the initial selection, we employ the following explanatory variables in our analysis: 
1) total cash divided by total asset (Cash/Asset); 2) log of the total asset (Size 1); 3) total debt, 
including long-term and short-term debt; 4) Interest Bearing Debt; 5) total debt minus cash (Net 
Debt); 6) Operating Cash Flow; 7) Investing Cash Flow; 8) Financing Cash Flow; 9) log of total 
revenue (Size 2); 10) EBITDA; 11) Net Profit; 12) total operating income divided by total sales 
(Operating Margin); 13) the difference of operating income in two continuous year divided by the 
operating income of previous year (Operating Income Growth); 14) ROA; 15) ROE; 16) 
EBITDA/Revenue; 17) Operating Cash Flow/EBITDA; 18) Current Ratio; 19) Quick Ratio; 20) 
Inventory Turnover; 21) Book Leverage (Debt/Assets); 22) Short-term Debt/Total Debt; 23) 
Interest-bearing Debt/Invested Capital; 24) Cash/ Short-term debt; 25) Cash/Total Debt; 26) 
Interest Coverage Ratio; 27) EBITDA/Interest-bearing Debt.  
To ensure that the annual financial statement information is available for the rating agency 
when rating the firm for that year, we set a one-year lag for the financial statement data, which 
means that we employ the annual financial statement data for corresponding firms during the 
period 2006-2013. We choose annual report as the source of the financial data to maintain 
consistency of the period. For those firms failing to match their ratings data with their lagged 
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financial statement data, we give up the observations. At last we got a total number of 8774 valid 
observations in our final panel database. 
In addition, we obtain year dummies in our model to detect the impact of different years 
on the rating variables. To exclude the perfectly multicollinearity in year dummies, we set the 
first year 2007 as benchmark, and then add seven year dummies for 2008, 2009…2014, 
respectively. The year dummies are replaced by one period dummy in a further regression model. 
The value of the dummies is 1 if the ratings were graded in that time, 0 if not. 
Later, in the robustness section, we introduced macroeconomic data in the regression 
model following Baghai’s paper(2014): (1) GDP growth. We employ the GDP YoY growth. As 
the GDP growth for 2014 has not announced, we calculate the GDP growth for 2014 using the 
GDP Month to Month growth data, from Nov, 2013 to Oct, 2014. (2) Inflation rate. We employ 
the CPI YoY growth. We calculate CPI growth of 2014 using the same approach as GDP growth 
of 2014. (3) Slope of the term structure, computed as the yield on the constant-maturity 10-year 
Treasury bond minus the yield on the constant-maturity three-month T-bill in US market. Here in 
China, we compute it as the yield on the 10-year government bond minus the three-month 
government bond. Both the yield information is from the ChinaBond.com. (4) Corporate debt 
market index annual return volatility. Because the corporate debt market index began in 2008-1-2, 
we set the volatility as zero in 2007. The volatility in 2014 is calculated based on the daily data 
from 2014-1-1 to 2014-12-02. 
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4:  Methodologies 
 
 
4.1  Multiple Linear Regression with Year Dummies 
In our basic model, we conduct one multiple linear regression with year dummies added in 
the overall panel data, to measure the impact of the year effect on the rating variables. The 
dependent variable is the numeric credit rating score of one firm at a specific time, and the 
explanatory variables are information of the firms that may have impact on the rating.  
Besides, OLS is used in the basic model other than ordered logit, as OLS is more 
straightforward to study economic significance. Moreover, as unobservable firm specific 
variables exist, OLS is able to avoid bias from incidental parameter problems.  
The explanatory variables have one year lag than the rating variable and we have a total 
number of 27 explanatory variables. 
For n observations in year t, the multiple linear regression model is:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡𝑥1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑡𝑥2,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽27,𝑖,𝑡𝑥27,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑌2008 + ⋯ + 𝛾7𝑌2014 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 ; t = 2007,2008, … ,2014 
In this basic model, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡is the rating variable of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ observation in year t. 
𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽27 represent the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥27 represent the 
27 one-year-lagged explanatory variables. 𝑌2008, 𝑌2009, … , 𝑌2014 are year dummies. 𝛾1, 𝛾2, … , 𝛾7 
represent the coefficients of the year dummies. The key variables in this regression are year 
dummies.  
  
4.2  Difference of Coefficients Matrix 
On the basis of the coefficients of the year dummies, we employ the method to calculate 
the difference matrix between each coefficients, also the t-stat value for each difference to test 
their significance. 
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When calculating the standard error of the difference of the coefficients, we use the 
formula below: 
SD(𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎,𝑏) = √𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑏 − 2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎∗𝑏 
The degree of freedom is the number of the observations minus the number of the 
parameters. 
 
4.3  Revised Multiple Linear Regression with Period Dummies 
On the basis of the initial linear model, we partitioned the panel data in the sample period 
2007-2014 to two sub-periods, the pre-period and post-period, then employ one period dummy to 
replace the year dummies. Pre-period is benchmark and the period dummy stands for the 
post-period (the value of the period dummy is 1 if it is post-period, 0 if it is pre-period). OLS 
estimation method, rating variables and explanatory variables unchanged. 
To satisfy the constraint that each sub-period should at least contain two years, we have 
five possible cut-off year point choices
2
. Five revised regressions are conducted based on those 
cut-off year point choices. 
For n observations in year t , the revised multiple linear regression model is:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡𝑥1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑡𝑥2,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽27,𝑖,𝑡𝑥27,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑃 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 ; t = 2007,2008, … ,2014 
In this revised model, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡is the rating variable of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ observation in year t. 
𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽27 represent the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥27 represent the 
27 one-year-lagged explanatory variables. P is period dummy. If year t belongs to P, then P=1, or 
P=0 if not. 𝛾1 represent the coefficient of the period dummy, which is our key interest. 
 
4.4  Cross Sectional Regression  
Further, we try to find out how the rating standard changes between pre-period and 
                                                             
2
 The cut-off point year is categorized in the post-period, thereby a starting year of the post-period. 
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post-period. Therefore, for each cut-off point choice, we conduct two cross-sectional regressions 
based on the pre-period and on post-period respectively. As we have five cut-off point choices, 
we report 5 groups in a total of 10 regression results here, and focus on the coefficient of the 
explanatory variables this time. 
Given each cut-off year point Y, for n observations in year t, the two cross sectional 
regression models are:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡𝑥1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑡𝑥2,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽27,𝑖,𝑡𝑥27,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 ; t ∈ [2007, Y); Y ∈ [2009,2013] 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑡𝑥1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑡𝑥2,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽27,𝑖,𝑡𝑥27,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 ; t ∈ [Y, 2014]; Y ∈ [2009,2013] 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the rating variable of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ observation in year t. 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽27 represent the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥27 represent the 27 one-year-lagged 
explanatory variables. We analyse changes in 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽27 both in-group and between-group. 
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5:  Empirical Regression Result 
 
 
5.1  Results From the Basic Regression Model 
Table 5.1 presents the basic regression result for the panel data (See Appendix 1).The 
model is generated from STATA. Missing values are considered as invalid observations and 
removed so that a total number of 8774 observations are obtained in the model. Figure 5.1 plots 
the coefficients of the seven year dummies during period 2008-2014. 
Figure 5.1 Coefficients of year dummies during period 2008 to 2014 
The main axis (left) plots the coefficients of the year dummies from 2007 to 2014(blue line). 
The sub axis (right) plots the standard deviation of the numeric ratings from 2007 to 
2014(red line).  
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Coefficient -1.89E-01 2.04E-01 3.56E-01 3.11E-01 3.87E-01 3.72E-01 3.98E-01
P-value 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0
T-stat -3.12 3.62 6.76 6.25 8.08 7.92 8.52
-3.00E-01
-2.00E-01
-1.00E-01
0.00E+00
1.00E-01
2.00E-01
3.00E-01
4.00E-01
5.00E-01
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 Observing the coefficient of the eight year dummies, we found that all the year dummies 
show positive statistically insignificant impact on the ratings, except for 2008, which has a 
negative sign. The coefficients show an increasing trend, from -0.189 at year 2008 to 0.398 at 
year 2014. It appears to suggest that the rating standard keeps relaxing through 2008 to 2014, 
compared to 2007 the benchmark.  
As for other explanatory variables, we obtain the result that 11 of 27 finance statement 
variables show statistically significance at 95% significance level. They are: (1) Cash/Asset; (2) 
Size 1(log of Total Asset); (3) Size 2( log of Total Revenue); (4) ROA; (5) ROE; (6) Current 
Ratio; (7) Debt/Assets; (8) Short-term Debt/Total Debt; (9) Cash/Short-term Debt; (10) 
Cash/Total Debt; (11) EBITDA/Interest-bearing Debt. Of all the significant variables, (2) Size 
1(log of Total Asset); (3) Size 2( log of Total Revenue); (4) ROA; (5) ROE; (7) Debt/Assets; (9) 
Cash/Short-term Debt; (10) Cash/Total Debt; (11) EBITDA/Interest-bearing Debt have positive 
impact on the rating, and (1) Cash/Asset; (6) Current Ratio; (8) Short-term Debt/Total Debt have 
negative impact on the rating.  
This result is consistent with the interview to the professionals in CCXI rating agencies 
that size, profitability, liquidity, solvency and capital structure of a firm play the most important 
role in ratings. Size1(log of Total Asset) and Size2( log of Total Revenue) measure the size of a 
firm. When the size increases, the rating level becomes better; ROA, ROE measure the 
profitability of a firm. A better profitability implies a better credit rating. As for the solvency of 
the firm, Cash/short-term Debt, Cash/Total Debt, EBITDA/interest-bearing Debt increase with a 
better solvency, thereby a better credit quality, while Short-term Debt/Total Debt decrease with a 
better solvency. 
However, we also find some interesting phenomenon which reverses the common sense. 
First, the coefficients of the liquidity of the firm (Cash/asset and Current Ratio) are both negative, 
implying that a better liquidity worsens the credit rating. Moreover, the positive correlation 
between capital structure (Debt/Asset) and rating leads to the argument that a higher leverage 
benefits the credit rating. Both discoveries are contrary to the public belief that a better liquidity 
and a lower leverage should imply a higher credit quality of the corporation debt. 
Nevertheless, such controversy is consistent with the US debt market, where a higher 
liquidity and a lower leverage also play a negative role in rating (Baghai 2014). Baghai argues 
that, the reason of the phenomenon is that a bad credit rating tends to have impact on the firm’s 
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decision about the cash holding and the capital structure. Firms will hold more cash and lower 
their leverage when they are disadvantaged by worse credit rating. 
 
5.2   Difference of Year Dummies Coefficients Matrix 
 
 
Table 5. 2  Difference of the year dummies coefficients matrix 
The coefficients of the year dummies are generated from the original multiple linear model 
with year dummies. For the cell of row i , column j, the first number in it is 
difference=coefficient(i)-coefficient(j). The number in the bracket is t-stat of the difference  
 
 
Diff 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2007 
0 
       
        
2008 
-0.189** 0 
      
（-3.115） 
      
2009 
0.204*** 0.393*** 0 
     
(3.616) (7.039) 
      
2010 
0.356*** 0.545*** 0.152** 0 
    
(6.755) (10.462) (3.266) 
     
2011 
0.311*** 0.500*** 0.107* -0.045 0 
   
(6.249) (10.163) (2.469) （-1.182） 
   
2012 
0.387*** 0.576*** 0.183*** 0.031 0.076* 0 
  
(8.079) (12.162) (4.444) (0.865) (2.440) 
   
2013 
0.372*** 0.562*** 0.168*** 0.016 0.061* -0.014 0 
 
(7.916) (12.040) (4.198) (0.477) (2.068) （-0.552) 
 
2014 
0.398*** 0.587*** 0.194*** 0.042 0.087** 0.011 0.026 0 
(8.516) (12.663) (4.883) (1.240) (2.981) (0.442) (1.095) 
 
    
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p< 0.001 
 
 
Looking into the table, we find that most of the differences between the coefficients of the 
year dummies are statistically significant on 95% confidence level. The result further proves that 
the difference of the rating standard do exist through time.  
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5.3  Results From Revised Regression Model 
 According to the coefficient of year dummies during the sample period (from 2007 to 
2014), the figure illustrate a relaxing rating standard trend occurred. We would like to further 
figure out whether the trend still exist when we use dummies for periods longer than one year.  
Table 5.3   Cross Section Regression Results in Two Sub Periods   
Model(1) is the original regression result with year dummies as a comparison. Model(2)to 
model(6)are revised regression results with cut-off period points of 
2009,2010,…2013,respectively. See full regression result in Appendix 2. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
year2008 -0.189
**
 
     
  (-3.12) 
     
year2009 0.204
***
 
     
  (3.62) 
     
year2010 0.356
***
 
     
  (6.76) 
     
year2011 0.311
***
 
     
  (6.25) 
     
year2012 0.387
***
 
     
  (8.08) 
     
year2013 0.372
***
 
     
  (7.92) 
     
year2014 0.398
***
 
     
  (8.52) 
     
Post0914   0.455***         
  
 
(14.13) 
    
Post1014 
  
0.340
***
 
   
  
  
(13.39) 
   
Post1114 
   
0.216
***
 
  
  
   
(10.23) 
  
Post1214 
    
0.171
***
 
 
  
    
(9.31) 
 
Post1314 
     
0.106
***
 
            (6.16) 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p< 0.001 
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Table 5.3 contains the regression results for the period dummies from all cut-off point 
year choices, from 09 to 13. (See full regression result in Appendix 2).We don't include 08 and 14 
in the results, as in such cases, only one year include in one of the two sub-periods, which may be 
unpersuasive. We can see that all the coefficients of the period dummies in five models are 
statistically significant based on 99.9% confidential level. This table obviously implies that 
Chinese credit rating agencies have loosen their standards during time.  
As for the coefficients of the explanatory table, all the signs and significance of the 
explanatory variables stay consistency in all the original and revised models. Therefore, the 
discoveries about the impact on the ratings from the original model stay the same in revised 
model. 
 
 
5.4  Results From Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
See Appendix 3. 
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6:  Robustness Test 
 
In this section, we test a series of potential problems that may undermine our conclusion. 
The first problem is that, as our explanatory variables are from the financial statement of firms, 
the variables may have multicollinearity effects. We use STATA to calculate the VIF value for 
each explanatory variable to test the effect. Next, our finding about the rating standard relax has 
another possible interpretations, which is that the rating agencies simply have adjusted their 
criteria over time to respond to the changes in the macroeconomic environment. To test this 
argument, we add additional explanatory variables to explain the impact of the macroeconomic 
environment on ratings, and focus on the new coefficients of time dummies. If the time effects 
still exist in our model after we add macro-economic explanatory variables, then we can exclude 
the alternative explanation. 
6.1  Multicollinearity Test 
Considering that there may exists multicollinearity in the explanatory variables, we first 
conduct a VIF test for the variables of the basic regression model with year dummies, and the 
variables of the further regression model with two sub-period year dummies. The result is 
exhibited in table 6.1. All the VIF value of the year dummies and the period dummy are below 10. 
Therefore, the possibility of multicollinearity in the time dummies can be excluded.  
However, we also notice some variables have high VIF. Although those variables are all 
insignificant in the model, a high average VIF implies that the whole model may be unstable in 
the multicollinearity. A future solution for this problem would be excluding those explanatories 
and redo the regressions.  
Table 6.1   VIF value of the explanatory variables 
Model(1) is the original regression result with year dummies; Model(2) is the revised 
regression model with two sub-period dummies. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Period (2011-2014)  1.06 
year2008 1.97 - 
year2009 2.35 - 
year2010 3.00 - 
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 (1) (2) 
year2011 3.81 - 
year2012 4.86 - 
year2013 5.76 - 
year2014 6.21 - 
Cash/Asset 6.22 6.20 
Size 1 3.37 3.36 
Total Debt 36.87 36.83 
Interest Bearing Debt 101.90 101.88 
Net Debt 42.28 42.27 
Operating Cash Flow 44.04 43.83 
Investing Cash Flow 54.04 53.77 
Financing Cash Flow 7.77 7.74 
Size 2 3.92 3.91 
EBITDA 85.60 85.45 
Net Profit 18.85 18.84 
Operating Margin 1.00 1.00 
Operating Income Growth 1.01 1.00 
ROA 1.59 1.56 
ROE 1.15 1.15 
EBITDA/Revenue 1.05 1.04 
Operating Cash Flow/EBITDA 1.00 1.00 
Current Ratio 3.22 3.22 
Quick Ratio 6.86 6.86 
Inventory Turnover 1.01 1.01 
Debt/Assets 7.01 7.00 
Short-term Debt/Total Debt 2.29 2.28 
Interest-Bearing Debt/Invested Capital 5.83 5.83 
Cash/Short-term Debt 4.60 4.59 
Cash/Total Debt 6.39 6.39 
Interest Coverage Ratio 1.00 1.00 
EBITDA/Interest Bearing Debt 1.10 1.10 
Mean VIF 14.09 16.11 
 
6.2  Additional Specifications of the Explanatory Variables 
The purpose of this test is to evaluate the alternative explanation for our findings: Rating 
agencies might just simply raise all the rating levels of the firms to fit a better macro-economic 
condition, rather than relaxing their standard. 
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Following the Baghai’s paper (2014), we add four macroeconomic variables which may 
have impact on the ratings variables in our regression model: (1) GDP growth; (2) Inflation; (3) 
the Slope of Term Structure; (4) Corporation Debt Market Volatility
3
.  
The first way to evaluate the explanation is to add these variables in both the model with 
year dummies and the revised regression models with different period dummies. However, the 
year dummies absorb the variation in the macro variables, several of the coefficients on the year 
dummies are therefore no longer identified. This phenomenon is similar in Baghai’s paper (2014) 
about US market. As such, it becomes impossible to interpret the coefficients on the remaining 
year dummies. (Baghai, 2014).  
To address the problem, we conduct a second way: follow the solution in Baghai’s paper, 
including a linear time trend variable instead of the year dummies. The linear time trend variable 
value equals to 1 when the observation happened at 2007, equals to 2 when 2008,….etc. After we 
generate this trend variable, we first report a regression model with a time trend and without the 
macroeconomic variables in model(11), then include a regression model with a time trend and 
with the macroeconomic variables in model(12). The results are presented at table 6.2. 
The result from the first way is not perfect: With cut-off point 2010, 2011, 2013, the 
period dummy coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence interval after adding the 
macroeconomic variables. However, with cut-off point 2009 and 2012, the dummy is no longer 
significant. 
The result from the second way is more satisfactory. As we proposed in the paper, in 
model (11), the linear trend variable shows a statistically significant positive impact on ratings on 
99.9% confidence level. After we add the macro variables on the basis of model(11), the 
coefficient of linear trend variable falls to 95% confidence level, but still stays positive and 
statistically significant. Such finding further proves our conclusion that, even excluding the 
explanatory power on the macro economy changes from the time effect, the inflation on the 
ratings still exist through time. 
Looking into the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables, we found almost all of 
them are statistically significant at least on 95% confidence interval. Only group1 (09-14) and 
group2 (10-14) are exceptions. The GDP growth and market volatility have negative impact on 
                                                             
3
 The method to calculate those variables are shown on Data chapter. See Appendix 4 for full database. 
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rating, while the CPI and Term Structure slope have positive impact on rating. 
4
The signs of 
GDP growth variable and CPI variable are inversed from the result in US market and also 
opposite to our common sense. A possible explanation about the discovery may be the unstable 
estimation.  
Nevertheless, the statistically significant coefficients of the macro economic variables at 
least imply an embarrassing failure of the rating job, since the rating agencies should “rate 
through the cycle” (Standard&Poors, 2008). 
                                                             
4
 Nevertheless, these discoveries are not warranted, because the model consist some variables which have 
high VIFs, so estimations here may be unstable. 
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Table 6.2   Robustness result adding macro-economic variables  
Results from 5 groups with different cut-off year plus a result from linear model are presented in the table. The first row gives the five groups, named 
by the range of their post-period .e.g. Post0914means this group is cut off by 2009, and the post-period is from 2009 to 2014. Model (1), Model 
(3)…Model (9)are without macro-economic variables, compared to Model (2), Model (4)…Model (10) with macro-economic variables. Model (11) is 
regression model with only the linear trend variable; model (12) is regression model with both the linear trend variable and with macro-economic 
variables. 
 
 
  Post0914 Post1014 Post1114 Post1214 Post1314 Linear Trend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post0914 0.455*** 0.153                     
  (14.13) (1.39) 
          
Post1014 
  
0.340*** 0.220** 
        
  
  
(13.39) (2.87) 
        
Post1114 
    
0.216*** -0.194* 
      
  
    
(10.23) (-2.31) 
      
Post1214 
      
0.171*** 4.23E-03 
    
  
      
(9.31) (0.07) 
    
Post1314 
        
0.106*** 0.0732* 
  
                  (6.16) (2.45)     
Linear Trend 
          
0.0544*** 0.0276* 
  
          
(12.17) (1.99) 
  
            
GDP Growth 
 
-7.382 
 
-4.989 
 
-16.16*** 
 
-12.38*** 
 
-14.12*** 
 
-10.09*** 
  
 
(-1.90) 
 
(-1.69) 
 
(-7.37) 
 
(-8.37) 
 
(-8.74) 
 
(-5.47) 
  
            
CPI Growth 
 
3.146 
 
0.308 
 
7.301*** 
 
5.695** 
 
8.256*** 
 
5.939*** 
  
 
(1.47) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(5.12) 
 
(2.91) 
 
(5.06) 
 
(4.82) 
  
            
Term Structure 
Slope  
0.14 
 
0.138* 
 
0.225*** 
 
0.271*** 
 
0.375*** 
 
0.296*** 
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  Post0914 Post1014 Post1114 Post1214 Post1314 Linear Trend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  
 
(1.36) 
 
(2.13) 
 
(4.49) 
 
(3.42) 
 
(5.84) 
 
(6.04) 
  
            
Market Volatility 
 
-165.8** 
 
-114.7* 
 
-291.3*** 
 
-230.3*** 
 
-247.8*** 
 
-202.8*** 
  
 
(-3.25) 
 
(-2.53) 
 
(-8.68) 
 
(-11.07) 
 
(-11.31) 
 
(-8.14) 
                          
N 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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7:  Conclusion 
 
After analyzing the credit rating data of a sample size of 8774 valid observations through 
the period 2007 to 2014, our research leads to the conclusion that rating agencies in China tend to 
loose their rating standard through time especially after the financial crisis, which is opposite to 
the findings in US debt market.  
Besides, we explore the factors that may have impact on the ratings. Size, profitability, 
capital structure, solvency and liquidity would influence a firm’s rating. The result is consistent 
with the claims of the rating agency professionals, except for an interesting discovery that better 
liquidity and lower book leverage will harm the rating, rather than benefit the rating.  
Then, we compare changes in the rating standard between the pre-period 2007 to2010, and 
the post-period 2011 to 2014.  
Last but not least, a decreasing standard deviation of the rating and failure to rate through 
the economic cycle imply that the rating agencies need to improve their rating quality in the 
future. 
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Appendices 
 
1.  Regression Result of Basic Model with Year Dummies 
 
Table 5.1: This model includes all data from 2007 to 2014, with a total number of 8774 valid 
observations. 
 
 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of 
obs  
= 8.77E+03 
Model 7.40E+03 3.40E+01 2.18E+02 
 
F(34, 8739)  = 3.63E+02 
Residual 5.24E+03 8.74E+03 6.00E-01 
 
Prob > F  = 0.00E+00 
Total 1.26E+04 8.77E+03 1.44E+00 
 
R-squared = 5.86E-01 
     
Adj 
R-squared 
= 5.84E-01 
     
Root MSE = 7.74E-01 
 
 
Rating Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
year2008 -1.89E-01 6.08E-02 -3.12E+00 2.00E-03 -3.09E-01 -7.03E-02 
year2009 2.04E-01 5.64E-02 3.62E+00 0.00E+00 9.33E-02 3.14E-01 
year2010 3.56E-01 5.26E-02 6.76E+00 0.00E+00 2.52E-01 4.59E-01 
year2011 3.11E-01 4.97E-02 6.25E+00 0.00E+00 2.13E-01 4.08E-01 
year2012 3.87E-01 4.78E-02 8.08E+00 0.00E+00 2.93E-01 4.80E-01 
year2013 3.72E-01 4.70E-02 7.92E+00 0.00E+00 2.80E-01 4.64E-01 
year2014 3.98E-01 4.67E-02 8.52E+00 0.00E+00 3.06E-01 4.89E-01 
Cash/Asset -7.45E-01 2.65E-01 -2.81E+00 5.00E-03 -1.27E+00 -2.25E-01 
Size 1 1.44E+00 3.14E-02 4.57E+01 0.00E+00 1.37E+00 1.50E+00 
Total Debt -1.55E-06 6.59E-05 -2.00E-02 9.81E-01 -1.31E-04 1.28E-04 
Interest Bearing 
Debt 
-7.65E-05 1.87E-04 -4.10E-01 6.82E-01 -4.42E-04 2.89E-04 
Net Debt 1.50E-05 1.44E-04 1.00E-01 9.17E-01 -2.66E-04 2.96E-04 
Operating Cash 
Flow 
-2.36E-04 3.81E-04 -6.20E-01 5.36E-01 -9.83E-04 5.11E-04 
Investing Cash 
Flow 
3.11E-04 3.56E-04 8.70E-01 3.82E-01 -3.87E-04 1.01E-03 
Financing Cash 
Flow 
1.10E-04 3.18E-04 3.50E-01 7.30E-01 -5.13E-04 7.32E-04 
Size 2 5.32E-01 2.19E-02 2.43E+01 0.00E+00 4.89E-01 5.75E-01 
EBITDA -3.03E-05 4.60E-04 -7.00E-02 9.48E-01 -9.32E-04 8.72E-04 
Net Profit -9.87E-04 5.38E-04 -1.83E+00 6.70E-02 -2.04E-03 6.82E-05 
Operating Margin -6.02E-07 4.37E-07 -1.38E+00 1.68E-01 -1.46E-06 2.54E-07 
Operating Income 
Growth 
-1.20E-05 6.75E-06 -1.78E+00 7.60E-02 -2.52E-05 1.25E-06 
ROA 9.06E-03 2.33E-03 3.90E+00 0.00E+00 4.50E-03 1.36E-02 
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Rating Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
ROE 6.13E-03 3.41E-04 1.80E+01 0.00E+00 5.46E-03 6.80E-03 
EBITDA/Revenu
e 
2.19E-05 8.91E-06 2.46E+00 1.40E-02 4.46E-06 3.94E-05 
Operating Cash 
Flow/EBITDA 
2.28E-04 2.49E-04 9.20E-01 3.60E-01 -2.60E-04 7.15E-04 
Current Ratio -1.39E-02 2.60E-03 -5.33E+00 0.00E+00 -1.90E-02 -8.77E-03 
Quick Ratio -6.62E-04 7.65E-03 -9.00E-02 9.31E-01 -1.56E-02 1.43E-02 
Inventory 
Turnover 
1.57E-05 1.27E-05 1.24E+00 2.17E-01 -9.23E-06 4.07E-05 
Debt/Assets 4.94E-03 1.38E-03 3.58E+00 0.00E+00 2.23E-03 7.64E-03 
Short-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
-7.18E-03 5.33E-04 -1.35E+01 0.00E+00 -8.23E-03 -6.14E-03 
Interest-Bearing 
Debt/Invested 
Capital 
-1.79E-03 1.03E-03 -1.74E+00 8.20E-02 -3.81E-03 2.29E-04 
Cash/Short-term 
Debt 
3.98E-02 1.27E-02 3.13E+00 2.00E-03 1.48E-02 6.47E-02 
Cash/Total Debt 5.87E-01 1.14E-01 5.14E+00 0.00E+00 3.63E-01 8.11E-01 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
1.42E-06 1.60E-06 8.90E-01 3.76E-01 -1.72E-06 4.57E-06 
EBITDA/Interest 
Bearing Debt 
2.70E-04 7.28E-05 3.71E+00 0.00E+00 1.27E-04 4.13E-04 
Constant 1.65E+01 1.01E-01 1.64E+02 0.00E+00 1.63E+01 1.67E+01 
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2.  Regression Result of Revised Model with Period Dummy 
   
Table 5.3: Model(1) is the original regression result with year dummies as a comparison. 
Model(2)to model(6)are revised regression results with cut-off period points of 
2009,2010,…2013,respectively.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
year2008 -0.189
**
 
     
  (-3.12) 
     
year2009 0.204
***
 
     
  (3.62) 
     
year2010 0.356
***
 
     
  (6.76) 
     
year2011 0.311
***
 
     
  (6.25) 
     
year2012 0.387
***
 
     
  (8.08) 
     
year2013 0.372
***
 
     
  (7.92) 
     
year2014 0.398
***
 
     
  (8.52) 
     
Post0914   0.455***         
  
 
(14.13) 
    
Post1014 
  
0.340
***
 
   
  
  
(13.39) 
   
Post1114 
   
0.216
***
 
  
  
   
(10.23) 
  
Post1214 
    
0.171
***
 
 
  
    
(9.31) 
 
Post1314 
     
0.106
***
 
            (6.16) 
Cash/Asset -0.745
**
 -0.782
**
 -0.751
**
 -0.664
*
 -0.638
*
 -0.692
**
 
  (-2.81) (-2.95) (-2.82) (-2.49) (-2.39) (-2.58) 
Size 1 1.435
***
 1.426
***
 1.432
***
 1.433
***
 1.430
***
 1.420
***
 
  (45.69) (45.41) (45.54) (45.33) (45.20) (44.81) 
Total Debt -1.55E-06 6.43E-06 1.25E-05 1.89E-05 2.22E-05 3.15E-05 
  (-0.02) (0.10) (0.19) (0.28) (0.33) (0.47) 
Interest Bearing 
Debt 
-7.65E-05 -7.31E-05 -8.40E-05 -6.79E-05 -6.87E-05 -7.43E-05 
  （-0.41） （-0.39） （-0.45） （-0.36） （-0.37） （-0.39） 
Net Debt 1.50E-05 1.52E-05 8.68E-06 -3.50E-06 -2.03E-06 3.18E-08 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (-0.02) (-0.01) 0.00  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Operating Cash 
Flow 
-2.36E-04 -3.04E-04 -3.74E-04 -1.70E-04 -2.89E-04 -4.69E-04 
  (-0.62) (-0.80) (-0.99) (-0.44) (-0.76) (-1.22) 
Investing Cash 
Flow 
3.11E-04 3.40E-04 1.87E-04 2.95E-04 2.12E-04 1.80E-04 
  (0.87) (0.95) (0.53) (0.82) (0.59) (0.50) 
Financing Cash 
Flow 
1.10E-04 3.20E-05 -6.14E-06 9.88E-05 1.38E-05 -7.87E-05 
  (0.35) (0.10) (-0.02) (0.31) (0.04) (-0.25) 
Size 2 0.532
***
 0.533
***
 0.532
***
 0.524
***
 0.525
***
 0.526
***
 
  (24.30) (24.31) (24.27) (23.80) (23.81) (23.81) 
EBITDA -3.03E-05 3.29E-05 -3.90E-05 -1.66E-04 -1.60E-04 -3.11E-05 
  (-0.07) (0.07) (-0.08) (-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.07) 
Net Profit -9.87E-04 -9.80E-04 -1.03E-03 -9.75E-04 -9.33E-04 -9.86E-04 
  (-1.83) (-1.82) (-1.90) (-1.80) (-1.72) (-1.81) 
Operating Margin -6.02E-07 -6.23E-07 -6.25E-07 -6.03E-07 -5.80E-07 -5.91E-07 
  (-1.38) (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.37) (-1.32) (-1.34) 
Operating Income 
Growth 
-1.20E-05 -1.29E-05 -1.33E-05* -1.28E-05 -1.05E-05 -1.16E-05 
  (-1.78) (-1.91) (-1.97) (-1.89) (-1.55) (-1.71) 
ROA 9.06E-03
***
 7.96E-03
***
 7.79E-03
***
 7.00E-03
**
 7.44E-03
**
 7.16E-03
**
 
  (3.90) (3.44) (3.36) (3.01) (3.19) (3.05) 
ROE 6.13E-03
***
 6.12E-03
***
 6.09E-03
***
 6.10E-03
***
 6.13E-03
***
 6.12E-03
***
 
  (17.98) (17.92) (17.81) (17.77) (17.82) (17.75) 
EBITDA/Revenue 2.19E-05
*
 2.16E-05
*
 2.17E-05
*
 2.56E-05
**
 2.44E-05
**
 2.31E-05
*
 
  (2.46) (2.42) (2.43) (2.86) (2.71) (2.56) 
Operating Cash 
Flow/EBITDA 
2.28E-04 2.21E-04 2.23E-04 2.26E-04 2.27E-04 2.30E-04 
  (0.92) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.91) (0.92) 
Current Ratio -1.39E-02
***
 -1.38E-02
***
 -1.37E-02
***
 -1.41E-02
***
 -1.40E-02
***
 -1.38E-02
***
 
  (-5.33) (-5.31) (-5.25) (-5.39) (-5.33) (-5.27) 
Quick Ratio -6.62E-04 1.46E-04 -7.58E-04 -8.87E-04 -7.40E-04 8.02E-04 
  (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.10) (0.10) 
Inventory 
Turnover 
1.57E-05 1.62E-05 1.64E-05 1.59E-05 1.50E-05 1.77E-05 
  (1.24) (1.27) (1.29) (1.24) (1.16) (1.38) 
Debt/Assets 4.94E-03
***
 4.91E-03
***
 4.60E-03
***
 4.50E-03
**
 4.71E-03
***
 4.72E-03
***
 
  (3.58) (3.56) (3.33) (3.25) (3.39) (3.39) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
-7.18E-03
***
 -7.30E-03
***
 -7.18E-03
***
 -7.34E-03
***
 -7.51E-03
***
 -7.60E-03
***
 
  (-13.47) (-13.69) (-13.44) (-13.68) (-14.02) (-14.13) 
Interest-bearing 
Debt/Invested 
Capital 
-1.79E-03 -1.95E-03 -1.69E-03 -1.61E-03 -1.77E-03 -1.96E-03 
  (-1.74) (-1.90) (-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.71) (-1.88) 
Cash/Short-term 
Debt 
0.0398
**
 0.0381
**
 0.0389
**
 0.0415
**
 0.0412
**
 0.0375
**
 
  (3.13) (2.99) (3.05) (3.24) (3.21) (2.92) 
Cash/Total Debt 0.587
***
 0.593
***
 0.585
***
 0.571
***
 0.580
***
 0.597
***
 
  (5.14) (5.18) (5.11) (4.96) (5.03) (5.17) 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
1.42E-06 1.44E-06 1.45E-06 1.44E-06 1.41E-06 1.62E-06 
  (0.89) (0.90) (0.90) (0.89) (0.87) (1.00) 
EBITDA/Interest 
Bearing Debt 
2.70E-04
***
 2.74E-04
***
 2.68E-04
***
 2.62E-04
***
 2.60E-04
***
 2.51E-04
***
 
  (3.71) (3.76) (3.67) (3.58) (3.55) (3.41) 
Constant 
 
16.48
***
 16.59
***
 16.74
***
 16.80
***
 16.89
***
 
    (170.67) (175.53) (179.06) (181.38) (183.74) 
N 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p< 0.001 
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3.   Results From Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Further, we try to find out how the rating standard changes between pre-period and 
post-period. Therefore, we conducted 5 groups of the cross-sectional analysis in a total of 10 
regressions. Results are exhibited in table 5.3. As a comparison analysis in 10 regressions would 
be too much, we choose the cut-off point 2011 to conduct the further analysis below. 
As we can see, in the post-period model (5), most of the signs and significance of the 
explanatory variables stay consistent with our discoveries in the original model. 
However, when it comes to the period 1, many explanatory variables show a different 
significance compared with model (1) and model (2). First, most of the explanatory variables 
measuring solvency (Cash/Asset, Cash/Short-term Debt, Cash/Total debt), all the explanatory 
variables measuring profitability of firms (ROA and ROE) lose their statistical significance in the 
rating model. Second, New statistically significant explanatory variables show up, such as 
EBITDA/Interest-bearing Debt, showing a positive impact on the ratings. 
Regarding to the significant factors in post-period, we believed that financial crisis in 
2008 has affected Chinese rating standards. Because of the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese rating 
agencies pay more attention to company debt liability. Securities issuers who have much debt 
obligation and do not have enough liquidity cash to operate the business will face downgrade risk.  
On the other hand, a significant result of EBITDA/Interest-bearing Debt, which is under 
99% confidential intervals, only appears in pre-period (2007-2010). Therefore, in the pre- period, 
only if the issuer companies can payback loan interest to banks, their securities credit rating grade 
will not influence a lot. 
In 99% confidential interval, total assets (Size1), total revenue (Size2) and current ratio 
have significant results both in pre-period and post-period. The total asset (Size1) coefficient 
declines after 2011 while total revenue increase slightly. However, current ratio has a negative 
coefficient to influence the credit rating standards, which increase a lot after 2011. 
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Table 5.4   Cross Section Regression Results for 5 groups with different cut-off points. 
The first row gives the five groups, named by the range of their post-period .e.g. Post0914means this group is cut off by 2009, and the post-period is from 2009 to 
2014.   
Model (1), Model (3)…Model (9) is for pre-period of each group. Model(2),Model(4)…Model(10) is for post-period of each group.  
 
 
  Post0914 Post1014 Post1114 Post1214 Post1314 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cash/Asset -1.286 -0.780** -1.961 -0.750** -1.032 -0.748* -0.386 -0.767* -0.488 -0.776 
 
(-0.91) (-2.85) (-1.77) (-2.69) (-1.24) (-2.57) (-0.75) (-2.41) (-1.36) (-1.90) 
           
Size 1 2.117*** 1.365*** 2.086*** 1.344*** 1.992*** 1.290*** 1.805*** 1.268*** 1.620*** 1.189*** 
 
(14.82) (42.31) (19.37) (40.67) (26.62) (36.86) (29.96) (34.10) (34.94) (25.53) 
           
Total Debt 6.31E-04 4.05E-05 1.46E-04 3.72E-05 5.65E-05 5.04E-05 2.00E-05 5.90E-05 7.34E-05 6.02E-05 
 
(1.75) (0.56) (0.62) (0.51) (0.33) (0.64) (0.16) (0.69) (0.79) (0.59) 
           
Interest Bearing 
Debt 
-1.22E-03 -9.57E-05 -2.41E-04 -7.63E-05 -1.17E-04 -1.07E-04 -2.04E-04 -1.04E-04 -3.21E-04 1.94E-05 
 
(-1.30) (-0.47) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.48) (-0.62) (-0.42) (-1.25) (0.06) 
           
Net Debt 4.56E-04 1.45E-05 -8.60E-05 -5.06E-06 6.06E-05 4.90E-06 1.97E-04 -3.63E-05 2.38E-04 -1.83E-04 
 
(0.77) (0.09) (-0.22) (-0.03) (0.20) (0.03) (0.83) (-0.18) (1.26) (-0.75) 
           
Operating Cash 
Flow 
-2.96E-03 -5.46E-04 -1.50E-03 -4.44E-04 -8.40E-04 -7.10E-04 -7.69E-04 -9.44E-04 -7.00E-04 -1.30E-03 
 
(-1.60) (-1.40) (-1.22) (-1.09) (-1.13) (-1.45) (-1.30) (-1.73) (-1.41) (-1.74) 
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Investing Cash 
Flow 
-1.42E-03 2.47E-04 -1.15E-03 3.52E-04 -4.66E-04 2.17E-04 -3.29E-04 4.62E-04 2.28E-04 -5.05E-05 
 
(-1.04) (0.67) (-1.13) (0.92) (-0.61) (0.51) (-0.59) (0.91) (0.52) (-0.08) 
           
Financing Cash 
Flow 
-3.60E-04 -1.56E-04 -4.99E-04 -1.48E-04 -4.60E-04 -2.99E-04 -2.31E-04 -3.52E-04 7.14E-05 -8.24E-04 
 
(-0.33) (-0.47) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.78) (-0.72) (-0.49) (-0.75) (0.19) (-1.33) 
           
Size 2 0.441*** 0.533*** 0.376*** 0.536*** 0.323*** 0.567*** 0.412*** 0.556*** 0.456*** 0.627*** 
 
(4.34) (23.72) (5.06) (23.16) (6.75) (22.40) (10.62) (20.39) (14.79) (17.23) 
           
EBITDA -2.06E-03 2.17E-04 -1.62E-03 2.76E-04 -1.31E-03 4.43E-04 -9.89E-04 1.18E-03 -1.96E-04 1.11E-03 
 
(-1.00) (0.45) (-1.04) (0.56) (-1.33) (0.82) (-1.31) (1.80) (-0.31) (1.39) 
           
Net Profit 3.04E-03 -1.27E-03* 8.94E-04 -1.32E-03* 5.64E-04 -1.43E-03* 3.11E-04 -2.19E-03** -2.74E-04 -2.51E-03* 
 
(1.43) (-2.26) (0.54) (-2.29) (0.53) (-2.26) (0.38) (-2.86) (-0.41) (-2.48) 
           
Operating Margin -8.69E-05 -6.04E-07 -1.39E-04* -6.00E-07 -2.26E-06 -5.51E-07 -3.89E-06 -4.76E-07 -4.45E-06 -4.93E-07 
 
(-1.37) (-1.39) (-2.38) (-1.39) (-0.73) (-1.26) (-1.53) (-1.10) (-1.82) (-1.11) 
           
Operating Income 
Growth 
6.78E-05 -1.28E-05 -1.42E-04 -1.29E-05 6.36E-06 -1.57E-05* -7.99E-06 -1.38E-05 -1.05E-05 -1.21E-05 
 
(0.23) (-1.91) (-0.51) (-1.94) (0.43) (-2.07) (-0.90) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.06) 
           
ROA 2.48E-03 8.41E-03*** 1.27E-02 8.73E-03*** 2.27E-03 6.87E-03** 2.52E-03 7.92E-03** 0.0110* 5.45E-03 
 
(0.17) (3.50) (1.31) (3.52) (0.28) (2.61) (0.40) (2.81) (2.38) (1.44) 
           
ROE 7.91E-03 6.19E-03*** 2.91E-03 6.21E-03*** 6.69E-03* 6.26E-03*** 7.36E-03** 6.28E-03*** 2.76E-03 6.38E-03*** 
 
(1.22) (18.22) (0.74) (18.28) (1.98) (18.37) (2.96) (18.64) (1.51) (18.31) 
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EBITDA/Revenue 1.21E-04 2.12E-05* 7.80E-05 2.12E-05* 8.77E-06 1.44E-04** 1.22E-05 126E-04** 1.71E-05 1.92E-03*** 
 
(0.30) (2.40) (0.37) (2.39) (0.91) (3.16) (1.26) (2.67) (1.87) (4.99) 
           
Operating Cash 
Flow/EBITDA 
0.103** 2.19E-04 3.81E-02 2.20E-04 2.33E-02 2.23E-04 0.0410*** 2.03E-04 0.0298*** 1.35E-04 
(2.63) (0.89) (1.94) (0.89) (1.95) (0.90) (4.55) (0.84) (4.24) (0.54) 
           
Current Ratio -0.456*** -0.0138*** -2.12E-02 -0.0137*** -3.59E-02 -0.0212*** 7.23E-03 -0.0252*** -6.73E-03 -0.0217*** 
 
(-3.39) (-5.34) (-0.67) (-5.30) (-1.70) (-6.86) (1.34) (-7.52) (-1.70) (-5.03) 
           
Quick Ratio 0.407* 1.27E-05 2.16E-02 -4.41E-04 -2.30E-02 7.34E-03 -0.0628* 1.28E-02 5.36E-03 -0.0335* 
 
(2.51) 0.00  (0.30) (-0.06) (-0.52) (0.92) (-2.53) (1.59) (0.59) (-2.06) 
           
Inventory 
Turnover 
-1.36E-04 1.57E-05 2.03E-04 1.49E-05 1.05E-04 1.28E-05 1.77E-04 9.76E-06 1.87E-05 1.10E-06 
 
(-0.39) (1.24) (1.04) (1.18) (0.71) (1.01) (1.33) (0.78) (1.30) (0.04) 
           
Debt/Assets 8.34E-03 4.62E-03** 0.0137** 3.91E-03** 8.58E-03* 3.13E-03* 5.81E-03* 3.14E-03 6.97E-03*** 1.15E-03 
 
(1.39) (3.23) (3.09) (2.65) (2.46) (2.03) (2.20) (1.90) (3.55) (0.57) 
           
Short-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
-1.99E-03 -7.58E-03*** -4.54E-03* -7.55E-03*** -4.50E-03*** -7.58E-03*** -5.13E-03*** -7.87E-03*** -6.11E-03*** -7.86E-03*** 
 
(-0.84) (-13.83) (-2.50) (-13.42) (-3.57) (-12.61) (-5.11) (-11.80) (-7.97) (-9.89) 
           
Interest-bearing 
Debt/Invested 
Capital 
-1.28E-03 -1.91E-03 -1.92E-03 -1.39E-03 -5.98E-04 -1.65E-03 -1.44E-03 -1.30E-03 -2.15E-03 -1.69E-03 
(-0.32) (-1.79) (-0.64) (-1.26) (-0.25) (-1.42) (-0.76) (-1.05) (-1.48) (-1.12) 
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Cash/Short-term 
Debt 
9.80E-02 0.0388** -1.02E-01 0.0395** 9.49E-02 0.0928*** 0.0917* 0.111*** 7.63E-03 0.196*** 
 
(0.38) (3.07) (-0.63) (3.12) (1.54) (5.36) (2.51) (4.44) (0.54) (5.38) 
           
Cash/Total Debt 1.012 0.569*** 1.685** 0.541*** 0.998* 0.429*** 0.531* 0.428** 0.585*** 0.335 
 
(1.33) (4.89) (2.80) (4.62) (2.27) (3.49) (2.17) (3.10) (3.77) (1.79) 
           
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
2.23E-03* 1.43E-06 1.18E-05 1.45E-06 6.58E-06 1.52E-06 1.13E-07 1.53E-06 1.59E-06 1.89E-06 
 
(2.42) (0.89) (0.43) (0.91) (0.25) (0.95) 0.00  (0.98) (0.96) (0.21) 
           
EBITDA/Interest 
Bearing Debt 
3.51E-04** 2.09E-04* 3.76E-04** 1.95E-04* 4.02E-04** 1.69E-04 3.64E-04** 1.67E-04 3.78E-04*** 1.36E-04 
(2.76) (2.30) (2.99) (2.15) (3.26) (1.86) (3.14) (1.76) (3.42) (1.38) 
          
Constant 14.89*** 17.08*** 14.98*** 17.13*** 15.63*** 17.24*** 16.09*** 17.30*** 16.42*** 17.44*** 
  (32.19) (186.28) (42.90) (183.14) (60.91) (177.14) (85.35) (167.11) (121.21) (138.55) 
N 652 8122 1120 7654 1826 6948 2875 5899 4422 4352 
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4.  Robustness Result Adding Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Part1:Macroeconomic Factors Database: 
 
  GDP CPI 
Term Structure 
Slope 
Volatility 
2007 14.20% 4.80% 1.5403 0 
2008 9.60% 5.90% 1.0615 0.003104854 
2009 9.20% -0.70% 2.3219 0.001336202 
2010 10.40% 3.30% 1.7921 0.000775902 
2011 9.30% 5.40% 0.8893 0.000707243 
2012 7.70% 2.60% 0.8741 0.000471894 
2013 7.70% 2.60% 0.6267 0.000460747 
2014 7.30% 1.80% 0.8492 0.000584031 
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Part 2:  Results from 5 groups with different cut-off year plus a result from linear model are presented in the table. The first row gives the five 
groups, named by the range of their post-period .e.g. Post0914means this group is cut off by 2009, and the post-period is from 2009 to 2014. 
Model (1), Model (3)…Model (9)are without macro-economic variables, compared to Model (2), Model (4)…Model (10) with macro-economic 
variables. Model (11) is regression model with only the linear trend variable; model (12) is regression model with both the linear trend variable 
and with macro-economic variables. 
 
 
  Post0914 Post1014 Post1114 Post1214 Post1314 Linear Trend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post0914 0.455*** 0.153                     
  (14.13) (1.39) 
          
Post1014 
  
0.340*** 0.220** 
        
  
  
(13.39) (2.87) 
        
Post1114 
    
0.216*** -0.194* 
      
  
    
(10.23) (-2.31) 
      
Post1214 
      
0.171*** 4.23E-03 
    
  
      
(9.31) (0.07) 
    
Post1314 
        
0.106*** 0.0732* 
  
                  (6.16) (2.45)     
Linear Trend 
          
0.0544*** 0.0276* 
  
          
(12.17) (1.99) 
  
            
GDP 
 
-7.382 
 
-4.989 
 
-16.16*** 
 
-12.38*** 
 
-14.12*** 
 
-10.09*** 
  
 
(-1.90) 
 
(-1.69) 
 
(-7.37) 
 
(-8.37) 
 
(-8.74) 
 
(-5.47) 
  
            
CPI 
 
3.146 
 
0.308 
 
7.301*** 
 
5.695** 
 
8.256*** 
 
5.939*** 
  
 
(1.47) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(5.12) 
 
(2.91) 
 
(5.06) 
 
(4.82) 
  
            
Term Structure 
Slope  
0.14 
 
0.138* 
 
0.225*** 
 
0.271*** 
 
0.375*** 
 
0.296*** 
  
 
(1.36) 
 
(2.13) 
 
(4.49) 
 
(3.42) 
 
(5.84) 
 
(6.04) 
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Market Vol 
 
-165.8** 
 
-114.7* 
 
-291.3*** 
 
-230.3*** 
 
-247.8*** 
 
-202.8*** 
  
 
(-3.25) 
 
(-2.53) 
 
(-8.68) 
 
(-11.07) 
 
(-11.31) 
 
(-8.14) 
                          
Cash/Asset -0.782** -0.738** -0.751** -0.742** -0.664* -0.739** -0.638* -0.730** -0.692** -0.739** -0.648* -0.732** 
  (-2.95) (-2.78) (-2.82) (-2.80) (-2.49) (-2.79) (-2.39) (-2.75) (-2.58) (-2.79) (-2.43) (-2.76) 
  
            
Size 1 1.426*** 1.436*** 1.432*** 1.435*** 1.433*** 1.436*** 1.430*** 1.436*** 1.420*** 1.435*** 1.431*** 1.435*** 
  (45.41) (45.72) (45.54) (45.70) (45.33) (45.71) (45.20) (45.71) (44.81) (45.68) (45.42) (45.67) 
  
            
Total Debt 6.43E-06 -8.61E-07 1.25E-05 -8.18E-07 1.89E-05 3.79E-07 2.22E-05 1.74E-07 3.15E-05 -2.15E-06 6.85E-06 -1.33E-06 
  (0.10) (-0.01) (0.19) (-0.01) (0.28) (0.01) (0.33) 0.00  (0.47) (-0.03) (0.10) (-0.02) 
  
            
Interest Bearing 
Debt 
-7.31E-05 -7.40E-05 -8.40E-05 -7.74E-05 -6.79E-05 -7.78E-05 -6.87E-05 -7.48E-05 -7.43E-05 -7.41E-05 -5.97E-05 -7.44E-05 
  (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.41) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.37) (-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.40) 
  
            
Net Debt 1.52E-05 1.45E-05 8.68E-06 1.51E-05 -3.50E-06 1.57E-05 -2.03E-06 1.43E-05 3.18E-08 1.36E-05 -6.27E-06 1.33E-05 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (-0.02) (0.11) (-0.01) (0.10) 0.00  (0.09) (-0.04) (0.09) 
  
            
Operating Cash 
Flow 
-3.04E-04 -1.61E-04 -3.74E-04 -2.38E-04 -1.70E-04 -2.21E-04 -2.89E-04 -1.54E-04 -4.69E-04 -1.91E-04 -2.16E-04 -1.80E-04 
  (-0.80) (-0.42) (-0.99) (-0.62) (-0.44) (-0.58) (-0.76) (-0.40) (-1.22) (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.47) 
  
            
Investing Cash 
Flow 
3.40E-04 3.70E-04 1.87E-04 3.05E-04 2.95E-04 3.19E-04 2.12E-04 3.66E-04 1.80E-04 3.42E-04 2.21E-04 3.43E-04 
  (0.95) (1.04) (0.53) (0.86) (0.82) (0.89) (0.59) (1.03) (0.50) (0.96) (0.62) (0.96) 
  
            
Financing Cash 
Flow 
3.20E-05 1.50E-04 -6.14E-06 1.05E-04 9.88E-05 1.08E-04 1.38E-05 1.51E-04 -7.87E-05 1.41E-04 8.68E-05 1.46E-04 
(0.10) (0.47) (-0.02) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34) (0.04) (0.48) (-0.25) (0.45) (0.27) (0.46) 
            
Size 2 0.533*** 0.530*** 0.532*** 0.532*** 0.524*** 0.531*** 0.525*** 0.530*** 0.526*** 0.531*** 0.527*** 0.531*** 
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  (24.31) (24.22) (24.27) (24.31) (23.80) (24.28) (23.81) (24.22) (23.81) (24.27) (24.00) (24.26) 
  
            
EBITDA 3.29E-05 -5.12E-05 -3.90E-05 -3.70E-05 -1.66E-04 -4.72E-05 -1.60E-04 -6.51E-05 -3.11E-05 -4.03E-05 -1.63E-04 -5.31E-05 
  (0.07) (-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.36) (-0.10) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.35) (-0.12) 
  
            
Net Profit -9.80E-04 -9.76E-04 -1.03E-03 -9.83E-04 -9.75E-04 -9.74E-04 -9.33E-04 -9.71E-04 -9.86E-04 -9.88E-04 -9.65E-04 -9.84E-04 
  (-1.82) (-1.81) (-1.90) (-1.83) (-1.80) (-1.81) (-1.72) (-1.80) (-1.81) (-1.84) (-1.78) (-1.83) 
  
            
Operating Margin -6.23E-07 -6.07E-07 -6.25E-07 -6.01E-07 -6.03E-07 -6.06E-07 -5.80E-07 -6.03E-07 -5.91E-07 -5.98E-07 -5.63E-07 -5.94E-07 
  (-1.42) (-1.39) (-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.37) (-1.39) (-1.32) (-1.38) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-1.36) 
  
            
Operating Income 
Growth 
-1.29E-05 -1.23E-05 -1.33E-05* -1.19E-05 -1.28E-05 -1.19E-05 -1.05E-05 -1.21E-05 -1.16E-05 -1.22E-05 -1.10E-05 -1.20E-05 
  (-1.91) (-1.82) (-1.97) (-1.76) (-1.89) (-1.76) (-1.55) (-1.79) (-1.71) (-1.80) (-1.62) (-1.78) 
  
            
ROA 7.96E-03*** 8.69E-03*** 7.79E-03*** 8.98E-03*** 7.00E-03** 8.72E-03*** 7.44E-03** 8.55E-03*** 7.16E-03** 9.03E-03*** 8.79E-03*** 8.91E-03*** 
  (3.44) (3.74) (3.36) (3.86) (3.01) (3.76) (3.19) (3.69) (3.05) (3.88) (3.77) (3.83) 
  
            
ROE 6.12E-03*** 6.13E-03*** 6.09E-03*** 6.13E-03*** 6.10E-03*** 6.13E-03*** 6.13E-03*** 6.13E-03*** 6.12E-03*** 6.14E-04*** 6.15E-04*** 6.14E-04*** 
  (17.92) (17.96) (17.81) (17.98) (17.77) (17.96) (17.82) (17.96) (17.75) (17.99) (17.96) (17.99) 
  
            
EBITDA/Revenue 
2.16E-05* 2.29E-05* 2.17E-05* 2.19E-05* 2.56E-05** 2.20E-05* 2.44E-05** 2.29E-05* 2.31E-05* 2.25E-05* 2.46E-05** 2.27E-05* 
(2.42) (2.57) (2.43) (2.46) (2.86) (2.47) (2.71) (2.57) (2.56) (2.53) (2.75) (2.54) 
  
            
Operating Cash 
Flow/EBITDA 
2.21E-04 2.24E-04 2.23E-04 2.27E-04 2.26E-04 2.24E-04 2.27E-04 2.25E-04 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 2.43E-04 2.31E-04 
(0.89) (0.90) (0.89) (0.91) (0.90) (0.90) (0.91) (0.91) (0.92) (0.93) (0.97) (0.93) 
  
            
Current Ratio -0.0138*** -0.0139*** -0.0137*** -0.0139*** -0.0141*** -0.0138*** -0.0140*** -0.0140*** -0.0138*** -0.0140*** -0.0142*** -0.0140*** 
  (-5.31) (-5.36) (-5.25) (-5.33) (-5.39) (-5.32) (-5.33) (-5.36) (-5.27) (-5.37) (-5.45) (-5.38) 
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Quick Ratio 1.46E-04 -8.14E-04 -7.58E-04 -7.92E-04 -8.87E-04 -9.89E-04 -7.40E-04 -1.01E-03 8.02E-04 -6.08E-04 -4.30E-04 -7.71E-04 
  (0.02) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.13) (0.10) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.10) 
  
            
Inventory 
Turnover 
1.62E-05 1.53E-05 1.64E-05 1.55E-05 1.59E-05 1.49E-05 1.50E-05 1.49E-05 1.77E-05 1.60E-05 1.68E-05 1.57E-05 
(1.27) (1.20) (1.29) (1.22) (1.24) (1.17) (1.16) (1.17) (1.38) (1.26) (1.32) (1.23) 
            
Debt/Assets 4.91E-03*** 4.90E-03*** 4.60E-03*** 4.92E-03*** 4.50E-03** 4.90E-03*** 4.71E-03*** 4.87E-03*** 4.72E-03*** 4.92E-03*** 4.77E-03*** 4.89E-03*** 
  (3.56) (3.56) (3.33) (3.57) (3.25) (3.56) (3.39) (3.53) (3.39) (3.57) (3.44) (3.55) 
  
            
Short-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
-7.30E-03*** -7.19E-03*** -7.18E-03*** -7.19E-03*** -7.34E-03*** -7.20E-03*** -7.51E-03*** -7.20E-03*** -7.60E-03*** -7.18E-03*** -7.34E-03*** -7.19E-03*** 
(-13.69) (-13.48) (-13.44) (-13.49) (-13.68) (-13.51) (-14.02) (-13.51) (-14.13) (-13.47) (-13.73) (-13.49) 
  
            
Interest-bearing 
Debt/Invested 
Capital 
-1.95E-03 -1.76E-03 -1.69E-03 -1.78E-03 -1.61E-03 -1.77E-03 -1.77E-03 -1.75E-03 -1.96E-03 -1.77E-03 -1.69E-03 -1.76E-03 
(-1.90) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.73) (-1.55) (-1.72) (-1.71) (-1.70) (-1.88) (-1.72) (-1.63) (-1.71) 
  
            
Cash/Short-term 
Debt 
0.0381** 0.0405** 0.0389** 0.0400** 0.0415** 0.0403** 0.0412** 0.0409** 0.0375** 0.0400** 0.0411** 0.0404** 
(2.99) (3.18) (3.05) (3.14) (3.24) (3.17) (3.21) (3.22) (2.92) (3.15) (3.22) (3.18) 
            
Cash/Total Debt 
0.593*** 0.583*** 0.585*** 0.587*** 0.571*** 0.585*** 0.580*** 0.582*** 0.597*** 0.585*** 0.576*** 0.584*** 
(5.18) (5.10) (5.11) (5.13) (4.96) (5.12) (5.03) (5.09) (5.17) (5.12) (5.02) (5.11) 
  
            
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
1.44E-06 1.38E-06 1.45E-06 1.40E-06 1.44E-06 1.35E-06 1.41E-06 1.35E-06 1.62E-06 1.44E-06 1.55E-06 1.41E-06 
(0.90) (0.86) (0.90) (0.87) (0.89) (0.84) (0.87) (0.84) (1.00) (0.89) (0.96) (0.88) 
  
            
EBITDA/Interest 
Bearing Debt 
2.74E-04*** 2.70E-04*** 2.68E-04*** 2.70E-04*** 2.62E-04*** 2.71E-04*** 2.60E-04*** 2.70E-04*** 2.51E-04*** 2.69E-04*** 2.66E-04*** 2.68E-04*** 
(3.76) (3.71) (3.67) (3.71) (3.58) (3.72) (3.55) (3.70) (3.41) (3.69) (3.64) (3.68) 
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Constant 16.48*** 17.23*** 16.59*** 17.02*** 16.74*** 18.15*** 16.80*** 17.63*** 16.89*** 17.58*** 16.56*** 17.23*** 
  (170.67) (54.56) (175.53) (70.61) (179.06) (74.33) (181.38) (106.40) (183.74) (157.69) (171.23) (73.27) 
N 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 8774 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
